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Abstract
Governments all over the world have invested tens of billions of dollars in car
scrappage programs to fuel the economy in 2009. We investigate the German
case using a unique micro transaction dataset covering the years 2007 to 2010.
Our focus is on the incidence of the subsidy, i.e., we ask how much of the e 2,500
buyer subsidy is captured by the supply-side through an increase in selling prices.
Using regression analysis, we ﬁnd that average prices in fact decreased for sub-
sidized buyers in comparison to non-subsidized ones, suggesting that eventually
subsidized customers beneﬁtted by more than the subsidy amount. However,
the incidence was heterogeneous across price segments. Subsidized buyers of
cheap cars paid more than comparable buyers who did not receive the subsidy,
e.g. for cars of e 12,000 car dealers reaped about 8% of the scrappage prime.
The opposite was true for more expensive cars, e.g. subsidized buyers of cars of
e 32,000 were granted an extra discount of about e 1,100. For cars priced about
e 18,000, we ﬁnd no price discrimination, i.e., in this price segment consumers
fully captured the transfer. Our results can be explained by optimizing behavior
on the supply-side both in the lower and upper price segments. The results are
extremely robust to extensive sensitivity checks.
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1 Introduction
As a reaction to the 2007 economic crisis, governments around the world launched
car scrappage programs to stimulate the economy. While the U.S. spent $3 bil-
lion on their “Cash-for-Clunkers” program, Germany afforded the most expen-
sive scheme of all countries with a total volume of about $7 billion (e 5 billion).
Most programs took effect in 2009 but they were neither a recent invention nor
limited to cars alone. Given their popularity amongst policy makers and con-
sumers (i.e., voters), similar programs are likely to be adopted in the future. A
careful evaluation of the incidence of the government intervention is therefore
a highly relevant policy question that has not yet been treated in the literature
concerned with scrapping schemes.
The German scrappage program, called Abwrackprämie (scrappage prime) or
Umweltprämie (environmental prime), started in late January 2009. To receive
the lump-sum subsidy of e 2,500 (about $3,500), buyers (private households)
had to prove scrappage of an old car and registration of a new one. By September
2009, the budget was exhausted, subsidizing the purchase of 2 million new
cars. Car dealers in general managed the scrapping of the old car and dealt
with the responsible federal agency. In many cases, they even advanced the
money of the subsidy. Thus, car dealers generally knew whether a customer was
receiving the subsidy or not. This suggests that there was potential for price
discrimination in the buyer-dealer price negotiations. Our market transaction
data, in line with national new car registration counts, show that purchases
for lower priced segments (like Mini, Small, Medium, and MPV (Multi Purpose
Vehicle) ) doubled in 2009 while a stagnation or a decline for more expensive cars
can be observed. Car dealers and the media reported that people were queuing
up in front of dealerships and dealers were busy writing up sales contracts rather
than doing anything else.
Using a unique sample of micro transaction data for Germany over the years
2007 to 2010, we ask how much of the e 2,500 buyer subsidy is captured by the
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supply-side through an increase in selling prices. To answer this question, we
apply linear regression methods and model the (percentage) discount from the
manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) as a function of the scrappage
dummy, the MSRP, and various controls. Our focus is on the discount received
by subsidized buyers in comparison to non-subsidized buyers controlling for
covariates. In a ﬁst step, we surprisingly ﬁnd that the average effect of the prime
on discount was slightly positive, implying that customers (on average) captured
more than the total amount of the subsidy. We therefore allow for heterogeneity
across price segments when comparing subsidized to non-subsidized purchases
and ﬁnd that these differ signiﬁcantly. Subsidized buyers of the ﬁrst quartile
(cheap cars) received less discount than non-subsidized buyers. Somewhere in
the second quartile, the difference was just zero implying just no pass-through
of the subsidy to the dealers at all. Above the median MSRP, the discount for
subsidized buyers was higher than the discount for non-subsidized ones.
To illustrate the heterogeneity in the incidence of the scrappage subsidy, con-
sider the following examples: For a e 12,000 car purchase, about 1.6 percentage
points of the MSRP were skimmed off by car dealers. Regarding the subsidy
amount of e 2,500 this implies that dealers captured approximately 8% of the
subsidy. For a e 32,000 car, on the other hand, dealers granted an extra 3.5
percentage points of the MSRP or about 45% of the subsidy. Put differently,
they granted an extra discount of approximately e 1,100 to attract customers
receiving the subsidy in comparison to those who did not. For a price of about
e 18,000 we observe no pass-through, i.e., customers captured the entire subsidy
of e 2,500. The results are extremely robust to all kinds of data restrictions as
well as model modiﬁcations.
This pattern can be explained by price discrimination depending on market
conditions in different market segments. The scrappage program shifted demand
heavily towards the lowest price segment (small cars), giving dealers some mar-
ket power and thus allowing for price making. Additionally, dealers were able
to identify two groups with a different price elasticity of demand. The group of
2
subsidized buyers was eager to buy a new—and due to the subsidy—very cheap
car and therefore tended to be comparatively less price sensitive. In contrast
to this, the group of non-subsidized buyers was more price sensitive. There-
fore, in this price segment car dealers were able to enforce a price-markup for
the subsidized group by granting lower discounts to these buyers as compared
to non-subsidized ones. As pricing in these lower segments is very aggressive
overall, this markup could not become very big. In the upper price segment
(large cars), demand was slack due to the ﬁnancial crisis and therefore stocks
were piling up. Dealers used additional discounts in order to attract the sub-
sidized buyer group who would have otherwise tended to buy a car in a lower
price segment (medium cars). In the upper price segment, receiving the subsidy
therefore revealed relatively high price elasticity because, contrary to customers
in the lower segments, buyers could easily downgrade. Non-subsidized buyers in
these segments, on the other hand, are marked by a rather pronounced brand
loyalty. For this group, granting additional discounts due to the crisis does not
make sense from a dealer’s perspective. In fact, rising discounts for this group
would put pressure on prices in the long term.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. Section
3 gives a short overview over the German scrappage program. Section 4 depicts
the dataset and develops the main hypothesis. Section 5 describes the empirical
model, shows the regression results as well as a graphical depiction of the main
speciﬁcations. After discussion for which price range the results are relevant,
it quantiﬁes the magnitude of price discrimination for this range. Section 6
provides an extensive interpretation and discussion of the results. Sensitivity
checks are presented in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst analysis evaluating the incidence
of a scrappage subsidy even though those programs have been in place since the
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early 90’s. The paper is closely related to the rapidly growing empirical litera-
ture on (tax) incidence. Evans et al. (1999), for instance, analyze the incidence
of a tobacco tax showing that 100% of a tax hike is passed onto consumers in
the form of higher prices. Hastings and Washington (2010) investigate the inci-
dence of a food subsidy and ﬁnd that the increase in aggregate demand induced
by beneﬁt delivery results in food price increases. Rothstein (2010) evaluates
the tax incidence using the EITC and states that a substantial portion of the in-
tended transfer to low income single mothers is captured by employers through
reduced wages. Chetty et al. (2009) show that consumers under-react to taxes
that are not salient and that the economic incidence of a tax depends on its
statutory incidence, and that even policies that induce no change in behavior
can create efficiency losses. Friedman (2009) analyzes the incidence of the Medi-
care Part D subsidy and ﬁnds that pharmaceutical ﬁrms would receive 36% of
total surplus over the next ten years relative to 56% for consumers. For an
extensive literature review on tax incidence see Kotlikoff and Summers (1987)
and Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
There is also some research regarding incidence within the automobile mar-
ket, albeit irrespective of the scrappage context. Busse et al. (2006) analyze
cash incentives directed at either the dealer or the customer. They show that
customer rebates are passed to the buyer to an extent of 70% to 90%. Dealer
rebates—which are mostly unknown to customers—are passed through only to
about 30% to 40%. Sallee (2011) investigates the case of the Toyota Prius, a car
that was tax-subsidized for its fuel efficiency. Despite a binding production con-
straint on the supply side, Sallee ﬁnds that the incentives are fully captured by
the customers. He suggests that this is due to a long-term pricing policy of the
manufacturer. Verboven (2002) analyzes quality-based price discrimination and
the implied tax incidence using tax policies toward gasoline and dieses cars in
Europe. He states that manufacturers consider a price-discriminating strategy
by charging different proﬁt markups on the gasoline and the diesel variants to
exploit consumer mileage heterogeneity. On average, about 75% to 90% of the
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price differentials between gasoline and diesel cars can be explained by markup
differences.
Within the scrappage context, however, most papers either care about sales
or environmental aspects. The literature consistently ﬁnds that the increases in
sales during the program are offset, often completely, by a decrease in sales in the
months after. For instance, Adda and Cooper (2000) and Licandro and Sampayo
(2006) examine a French and a Spanish program from the late 90’s respectively,
while Mian and Suﬁ (2010) and Li et al. (2010) estimate the impact of CARS
in the U.S. Hahn (1995), Deysher and Pickrell (1997), Kavalec and Setiawan
(1997), and Szwarcﬁter et al. (2005) estimate cost-effectiveness ratios ranging
widely from $2,000–$85,000 per ton of emissions reductions. Knittel (2009)
shows that CARS paid 4 to 10 times more per car than the social beneﬁt of
the resulting CO2 reductions would justify and therefore that there is great
potential to waste public funds with that kind of policy interventions.1
Our paper contributes to the literature in ﬁlling the gap of evaluating and
quantifying the incidence of car scrappage subsidies by analyzing the probably
most important program launched as a reaction to the recent economic crisis.
We develop a simple estimation strategy which can easily be applied to similar
programs in other countries.
3 Program description
As a reaction to the economic downturn starting in 2007, governments all over
the world provided incentives for car replacement. This kind of consumption
subsidy is supposed to have three major beneﬁts: (1) It is environmental-friendly
by replacing old fuel-consuming cars by new ones with better emission stan-
dards.2 (2) It helps the automotive manufacturing industry which plays a par-
ticularly important role in Germany and involves many stakeholders (the then
1There is also some theoretical literature regarding scrappage programs, including Moretto
(2000), Esteban and Shum (2007), Esteban (2007), and Mazumder and Wu (2008).
2The German program was actually named environmental prime by the government and it
required the new car to fulﬁll at least the emission standard Euro 4.
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vice-chancellor called it the “backbone of our economy”). Problems in this sector
would not only come along with the risk of actual layoffs and the corresponding
negative spill-overs but also harm consumer conﬁdence severely. (3) It induces
consumers to spend a multiple of the voucher’s value and can thereby create a
multiplier effect in the economy.
The idea for a scrappage program in Germany was picked up by the German
vice-chancellor Steinmeier in an interview on December 27, 2008. Only two
weeks later, the Government passed an economic stimulus package including a
scrappage program. The program officially started on January 14, 2009 and
ﬁrst key points were published on January 16, 2009 by the responsible agency
BAFA3. The subsidy of e 2,500 could be requested by private individuals who
scrapped an old car which was by the time of scrappage at least nine years
old and which had been licensed to the applicant for at least 12 months prior
to the application. The new car had to be a passenger car fulﬁlling at least
the emission standard Euro 4 and be licensed to the applicant. New cars were
deﬁned as those who were licensed for the ﬁrst time or as annual cars, i.e.,
had been licensed to a manufacturer or employee of the manufacturer for a
maximum of 12 months (14 months after July 2). The regulation thus made
sure only private individuals would beneﬁt from the subsidy and there were no
gains from buying and scrapping a used car. The money was transferred to
the respective buyer after scrappage of the old and registration of the new car
were proved. In general, car dealers organized the scrappage and dealt with
the federal agency. Many advanced the amount of the subsidy, taking it as a
down-payment.
The program turned out to be very popular and the original budget risked to
be used up in April. The government raised the budget amount to e 5 billion,4
just a few days after switching from a paper-based to an online application
3Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (Federal Office of Economics and Export
Control).
4To the best of our knowledge, this is the biggest budget pro-
vided for scrapping schemes in the world. For an overview see
http://www.acea.be/images/uploads/files/20100212_Fleet_Renewal_Schemes_2009.pdf,
last accessed on December 20, 2011.
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scheme. By September 2, 2009, the budget was exhausted, subsidizing the
purchase of 2 million new cars. The BAFA opened a waiting list of up to 15,000
slots in case of invalid applications. By the end of 2009 the bulk of the requests
had been treated by the agency. National new car registration counts show
that registrations for lower priced segments (Mini, Small, Medium, and MPV)
roughly doubled in 2009.
4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
We analyze a unique set of micro transaction data with 8,156 observations. The
data covers information from six randomly chosen car dealers in Germany over
six different brands providing information on the purchase of new cars over a
time frame of four years (2007–2010). One of those dealers covers two distinct
brands and one brand is represented by two different dealers. This helps to avoid
the risk of dealer- or brand-speciﬁc biases. Because of data privacy reasons we
never report the name of a respective dealership or brand. Table 7 in the
appendix gives a summary of the distribution.
The data covers detailed information on the car (brand, vehicle class, model)
and on the transaction, i.e., the MSRP (manufacturer’s suggested retail price, or
catalog price), the actual selling price, and hence the granted discount. It also
includes dealer speciﬁcs like the corresponding seller as well as buyer speciﬁcs
like age and sex. Most important, we have information on whether a car was
purchased with (CC) or without a Cash-for-Clunkers subsidy (non-CC) within
the year 2009.5
The distinction CC vs. non-CC is made throughout the year 2009. As de-
scribed in section 3, the budget was exhausted in early September 2009, but due
to the waiting list it was possible to ﬁnd car purchases marked with a CC indi-
5Other than new cars it was also possible to purchase annual cars with the subsidy. This
category is not considered here since new and annual cars show a very different discount
scheme. Moreover, more than 80% of all subsidy-purchases was on account of new car sales.
Annual cars are also excluded from the analysis because there is no reliable information on
their actual value which would correspond to the MSRP.
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Table 1: Number of Purchases over Time by Car Dealers and CC
Year of Purchase and Clunker’s Prime
2007 2008 2009 2009 2010
Car Dealer Non-CC CC
Dealer 1 315 443 587 317 504
Dealer 2 250 235 268 330 381
Dealer 3 263 314 277 359 286
Dealer 4 633 484 346 135 270
Dealer 5 81 67 60 43 43
Dealer 6 12 158 111 357 227
Total 1554 1701 1649 1541 1711
cator within our dataset from January 2009 until December 2009 which makes
the entire year 2009 our scrappage period. Moreover, the CC purchases are
concentrated in the months February to October and then fade out (see Table
8 in the appendix).6
Table 1 shows how the number of purchases is distributed over time within
our sample. Sales doubled due to the CC prime and this pattern can be found
for almost every single dealership included.
Table 2 provides a summary of essential variables of the overall dataset.
The average car cost about e 25,600 and earned approximately 17% discount.
Roughly 30% of all buyers are female. About 16% of all purchases refer to
demonstration cars and 12% refer to sales to employees of auto manufacturers
(called “company employees” subsequently). The average buyers age was 47
years but we only observe 1,425 (out of 8,156) data points featuring customer
age information. The remarkably high percentage discount over 50% (max) was
due to the fact that demonstration cars as well as company employees beneﬁt
from huge (and) additional discounts.7
Figure 1 shows the number of observed purchases for the different vehicle
classes over the observation period.8 Mainly cheap vehicle classes like A (Mini),
6This is in line with the distribution of applications for the subsidy as reported by the BAFA.
7The high discount of more than e 50,000 was observed for a demonstration car of the most
expensive category (luxury car segment).
8The classiﬁcation A, B, C, D, E, F, J, M, S is in accordance to the EU-classiﬁcation. For an
overview see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1406_en.pdf,
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Table 2: Summary Statistics: All Data
Variables Mean SD Med Min Max N
Discount in Percent 16.91 8.68 16.40 0.00 53.37 8,156
Discount in 1000 EUR 4.18 3.23 3.44 0.00 51.81 8,156
MSRP in 1000 EUR 25.62 14.37 21.50 8.19 198.66 8,156
Clunker’s Prime (CC) 0.19 0.39 0 0 1 8,156
Demonstration Car (DC) 0.16 0.37 0 0 1 8,156
Company Employee (CE) 0.12 0.32 0 0 1 8,156
Female 0.29 0.45 0 0 1 8,156
Age at Purchase 47.23 14.93 48 18 89 1,425
Note: MSRP is the manufacturer suggested retail price. DC is a dummy variable indicating whether
a buyer bought a demonstration car (DC = 1). CE is a dummy variable indicating whether the
buyer was an employee of a car manufacturing company (CE = 1). CC is a dummy variable
indicating whether the buyer of a car received the scrappage subsidy (CC = 1). Female is a dummy
of female buyers, the summary statistics therefore report the share of women.
B (Small), C (Medium), and M (MPV) beneﬁted from the program. Note that
there is no evidence for a severe dip in 2010. We rather observe a trend towards
some vehicle classes like B (Small) or J (Sport Utility Vehicle or SUV) to the
detriment of medium and large cars (C and D) as well as sports coupés (S).
Overall, it seems that the subsidized acquisitions did happen over and above
the regular purchases and were not pulled forward from the following purchase
period. We do not ﬁnd many additional purchases in vehicle classes D (Large),
E (Executive), F (Luxury), and S ( Sports Coupés).9
Figure 2 shows the development of the discount over time per vehicle class.
As mentioned above, inexpensive vehicle classes experienced an increase in car
purchases while the more pricey segments faced a staggering or declining de-
mand. One can see that some of the segments which experienced a positive
demand shock (Mini and Small) are the ones which get less discount through-
out 2009 when purchased as CC car compared to non-CC cars. For the other,
more expensive segments, the opposite happens: CC customers received com-
paratively more discount.10
last accessed on January 26, 2012.
9This is not surprising since expensive cars are predominantly purchased by corporate cus-
tomers, so they obviously played a minor role within the scrapping context.
10Summary statistics for the MSRP over vehicle classes are given in Table 10 in the appendix.
It shows that prices rise monotonically over the vehicle classes A through to F. The mean
price of MPVs is similar to Medium Cars; SUVs cost on average as much as Large Cars;
Sports Coupés are comparable to Executive Cars. The standard deviation of the prices
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Figure 2: Percentage Discount over Time by EU-Vehicle Class
The same pattern arises within vehicle classes (see Figure 5 in the appendix),
namely that subsidized cars are cheaper than non-subsidized ones. We therefore
control for MSRP in our regression model rather than interactions of “make,
model, and turn” as it was possible for Busse et al. (2006). More important,
using MSRP allows to control for differences in optional equipment since any
additional feature is included in the catalog price.
In a next step, we deepen this discussion a little further by moving from a
rather graphical to a more numerical focus and present essential ﬁgures. First,
we take a closer look at 2009 (Table 9 in the appendix gives summary statis-
tics for that year only). Due to the demand shock induced by the subsidy we
have to expect repercussions on the entire market. The average MSRP in 2009
was about e 2,500 lower compared to the overall mean due to a difference in
composition: more small and smallest cars were bought in that period. The av-
of the last three categories are about twice as big as the one of their respective reference
category. The last three vehicle classes are therefore consistent with the described pattern.
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erage discount in 2009 (17.7%) is relatively stable when compared to the overall
discount (16.9%). About 14% and 13% of the 2009 purchases refer to demon-
stration cars and company employees respectively. Table 3 shows the difference
for relevant variables between subsidized and non-subsidized purchases within
year 2009. It highlights that there is a difference in discount in percent and
Euro between the subsidized and non-subsidized cars which buttresses the as-
sumption of a dealer induced price discrimination. Non-CC cars got a discount
of 17.67% whereas CC cars received 16.51%.11 The corresponding absolute val-
ues are e 4,686 and e 3,235 respectively. These differences are signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. Yet, this should not lead to a hasty conclusion because we obvi-
ously have to take the MSRP into consideration: Non-CC cars on average cost
e 26,720 whereas CC cars amounted to about e 19,062.12 This means that cus-
tomers who called upon the subsidy on average asked for smaller (cheaper) cars
than customers who purchased without the subsidy denoting differences in the
group compositions of CC and non-CC customers. We will thus have to control
for MSRP in our regression analysis rather than for vehicle class. Furthermore,
there are about 25% women within the non-CC group and about 39% within the
CC group. The shares of demonstration cars and company employees are 19%
vs. 10% and 17% vs. 8% (non-CC vs. CC) respectively. The last information is
important because the unequal share of the two high-discount categories might
be driving the difference in percentage discount. Both categories make up for a
smaller share in the CC group compared to the reference group which implies
that the average discount of CC purchases would rather be biased downward
and with it the reported difference in percentage discount.13 In the following
analysis, we therefore have to control for both groups.
11Table 11 in the appendix gives an overview of the percentage discount’s development over
the years including a CC/non-CC distinction.
12The distribution of the MSRP of subsidized cars is concentrated among lower prices. Its
median is e 17,000 and the 75th percentile is at about e 22,000.
13Table 12 in the appendix shows the percentage discount by different so called types of pur-
chases (company employees, demonstration cars or any other purchase—called standard).
While company employees and demonstration cars receive average discounts of about 26%
and 23% respectively, a normal customer (no company employee) who did purchase a normal
car (no demonstration car) receives on average a discount of 14%.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics: Comparison within 2009 by CC
Non-CC CC Diff
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean
Discount in Percent 17.67 8.73 16.51 6.67 -1.16
Discount in 1000 EUR 4.69 3.80 3.24 2.15 -1.45
MSRP in 1000 EUR 26.72 15.27 19.06 7.56 -7.66
Demonstration Car (DC) 0.19 0.39 0.10 0.29 -0.09
Company Employee (CE) 0.17 0.38 0.08 0.28 -0.09
Female 0.25 0.43 0.39 0.49 0.14
Age at Purchase 44.84 14.92 48.19 15.08 3.35
Note: Non-CC are non-subsidized purchases, CC subsidized ones. The last column gives the differ-
ence between CC and non-CC purchases. MSRP is the manufacturer suggested retail price. DC is a
dummy variable indicating whether a buyer bought a demonstration car (DC = 1). CE is a dummy
variable indicating whether the buyer was an employee of a car manufacturing company (CE = 1).
Female is a dummy of female buyers, the summary statistics therefore report the share of women.
Both the descriptive and the graphical evidence suggest that price discrim-
ination across consumers of different market segments as well as price discrim-
ination between subsidized and non-subsidized buyers may have been present.
A closer look reveals that this probably depends on the vehicle class: subsidized
customers who bought (very) small up to medium cars received less discount
compared to non-subsidized customers; when purchasing bigger cars the oppo-
site seems to be true, namely that subsidized buyers received more discount
than non-subsidized ones. Yet, we need to control for various aspects like the
exact MSRP, the year of purchase, the kind of dealer and brand, as well as high
discount groups.
5 Model and Results
We wish to estimate the effect on consumers of receiving the scrappage prime,
a buyer subsidy, for their car purchases in comparison to otherwise comparable
non-subsidized buyers. As we saw in section 4, the effect is heterogeneous across
price segments. We ﬁrst present a basic speciﬁcation to estimate the average
weighted impact from which we develop an augmented speciﬁcation which takes
account of the heterogeneity. This full speciﬁcation models the discount of
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MSRP as a function of the scrappage-dummy interacted with MSRP as well as
the MSRP itself. We show graphically that this speciﬁcation is not sensitive
to a more ﬂexible estimation approach. Taking into account the distribution of
purchases and the share of subsidized purchases over the price range, we show
for which interval of MSRP our results are relevant. To illustrate the estimated
differences, we show the magnitude of price discrimination in percentage points
and Euros over what we consider the relevant price range.
5.1 Basic Specification
In our most basic speciﬁcation, we estimate the following regression model:
discount = α + β · CC + γ · MSRP + θ′ · X + % (1)
The dependent variable (discount) is the discount in percent of the MSRP
the household received for a single car purchase. The key explanatory variable
of interest is CC, namely the Cash-for-Clunkers dummy variable, i.e., an in-
dicator whether a car was purchased with the scrappage subsidy (CC = 1) or
without it (CC = 0). MSRP denotes the manufacturer’s suggested retail price
or catalog price (in e 1,000). It is an important control variable that allows to
take dealers’ discount policy in different market segments into account. The
vector X contains a set of other controls. Brands and dealers are modeled as
seven brand-dealer dummies, i.e., there is a dummy for each combination of
brand and dealer. Dummies for buyers who are employees of car manufactur-
ing companies (“company employees”, CE) and demonstration cars (DC) are
included. Also a dummy for each individual seller is included as well as a sex
dummy for buyers and year and month dummies to capture seasonalities and
macroeconomic effects are included. The error term is represented by %.
The estimated coefficients are α, β, γ and the vector θ. The key coefficient
of interest in this speciﬁcation is β. It measures the percentage difference in
discount a subsidized buyer received in comparison to an non-subsidized buyer.
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A positive (negative) estimate of β indicates that subsidized buyers received a
higher (lower) discount than non-subsidized buyers, controlling for the covariates
mentioned above. The coefficient γ measures how dealers’ discount policy differs
across price segments. To be precise, γ measures how the discount changes due
to an increase of e 1,000 in MSRP, holding other things constant.
Column (1) of Table 4 reports the results of estimating the speciﬁcation in
equation (1). The estimated coefficient β measuring the effect of receiving the
scrappage subsidy on the discount granted for a car purchase is 0.4. It is posi-
tive and statistically different from zero at the 10%-level. This suggests that the
overall pass-through of the subsidy was negative, i.e., dealers grant a 0.4 per-
centage points bigger discount for CC purchases than for non-subsidized ones,
controlling for the discussed covariates. Although the coefficient is quantita-
tively small (compared to a mean value of about 17%, see section 4), the result
is surprising since a capturing of a subsidy of more than 100% is not consistent
with the related empirical literature.14 The value of 0.05 for γ suggests that
the percentage discounts grows at a rate of about 0.05 percentage points with
every e 1,000 of MSRP. This means that a difference of e 20,000 implies a one
percentage point higher discount. Before discussing the controls in vector θ,
consider the full model which takes into account that the effect is heterogeneous
over the price range.
5.2 Full Specification
Speciﬁcation (1) has a shortcoming, namely that it restricts the effect of receiv-
ing the subsidy on the discount to be uniform across price segments. However,
as discussed in section 4, market conditions and discounts itself were different
over price segments. Therefore, we have reasons to expect the effect of the prime
to be heterogeneous over the whole price range.
To account for such a heterogeneous effect, we interact the dummy CC with
14Busse et al. (2006) ﬁnd a pass-through of 70%–90%, Sallee (2011) a full pass-through. Note
that these articles deﬁne pass-through as the share of the cash-incentive amount that remains
with the customer.
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the catalog price MSRP (CC ∗ MSRP ) and estimate the regression model in
equation (2).15 We thereby allow for differences between regular and subsidized
purchases varying over the MSRP. Results are presented in speciﬁcation (2) of
Table 4.
discount = α + β · CC + γ · MSRP + δ · CC ∗ MSRP + θ′ · X + % (2)
Estimating this speciﬁcation, all the essential coefficients—β, γ, and δ—are
statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% level. The results conﬁrm
our expectations: controlling for individual- and dealer-speciﬁcs as well as time
trends and high-discount groups (DC and CE), we ﬁnd a strong relationship
between the MSRP, the subsidy and the discount in percent. We see that β, the
coefficient for CC, is negative, with −4.4 rather big,16 and highly signiﬁcant.
The estimate for δ is 0.24 and hence positive, implying that the more expensive
a car was, the more additional discount was granted if the buyer beneﬁted from
the subsidy. The coefficient of MSRP (γ) is 0.03 and thus a little smaller than
in speciﬁcation (1) but qualitatively not different.
Note that throughout the different speciﬁcations, the controls in vector θ
remain stable: The coefficients of the controls for company employees (CE)
and demonstration car (DC) hardly change. While the coefficient of DC is
about 11, the one for CE is about 11.5. Consumers who bought a demonstra-
tion car received a plus of about 11 percentage points of discount compared to
buyers of non-demonstration (standard) cars. For company employees it is a
plus of about 10.5 percentage points. Both coefficients are always signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. These percentage values experienced some downward adjustment
compared to the descriptive analysis (see section 4) but are still impressively
different (lower) compared to a normal consumer who bought a normal car, i.e.,
15As discussed previously, we cannot simply interact CC with a set of vehicle class dummies
because within each such class, the two groups (subsidized and non-subsidized purchases)
differ.
16Note that the dummy itself has no meaningful interpretation as it measures the difference
to the overall constant for a price of zero. Interpreting this value as such would be an
inadmissible extrapolation.
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when the purchase involved neither a company employee nor a demonstration
car.
The year dummies display the difference in the discount level as compared
to the base year 2007. They are, across all speciﬁcations, about −0.6 for 2008,
−1.1 for 2009 and −0.4 for 2010. Discounts thus have been smaller over all three
years of observation and they have been smallest in 2009. Yet, this difference is
rather small.
Due to the interaction terms, the interpretation of the results is facilitated
if we do not discuss single coefficients but the expected percentage discount
as a (linear) function of the MSRP. For the group of non-subsidized buyers
(CC = 0), this function has a y-intersect (MSRP = 0) at the constant of 18.05
and a slope coefficient equal to 0.0335.17 For the group of subsidized buyers
(CC = 1), the function has a y-intercept of 18.05 − 4.401 = 13.65 and a slope
coefficient equal to 0.2440+0.0335 = 0.2775. The latter line is therefore steeper
than the former but starts lower. Thus, the two functions intersect at
Ilin = −β/δ (3)
where β measures the downward shift of the CC curve for MSRP zero and δ
the difference between the slope of the CC and the non-CC function. Equation 3
therefore gives the MSRP where both functions intersect. This value is reported
at the bottom of Table 4 (Intersect), it is about e 18,000 for speciﬁcation (2).
5.3 Flexible Estimation
In column (3) of Table 4, we test a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation by augmenting
the full model to a quadratic one where we include the square of the MSRP
and the square of the interaction term, (CC ∗MSRP )2. Speciﬁcation (3) shows
that the central coefficients like the MSRP, its square, the CC dummy, and the
17More precisely, the y-intersect depends on the constant as well as the coefficients of any
(binary) control variable. To focus on the relevant part of the function and since consid-
eration of these additional controls does not alter the results, we neglect this point in the
discussion.
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Table 4: Linear Regression Estimation Results of different speciﬁcations
All transactions
Dependent variable: Discount in Percent of MSRP
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
CC 0.398* -4.401*** -6.8527***
(0.233) (0.503) (1.3219)
CC*MSRP 0.244*** 0.4881***
(0.0228) (0.1220)
(CC*MSRP)2 -0.0050*
(0.0026)
MSRP 0.0453*** 0.0335*** 0.0871***
(0.00818) (0.00800) (0.0172)
MSRP2 -0.0005***
(0.0002)
DC 11.01*** 10.88*** 10.8575***
(0.277) (0.276) (0.2747)
CE 11.50*** 11.56*** 11.5432***
(0.313) (0.312) (0.3134)
Year = 2008 -0.615*** -0.631*** -0.6542***
(0.230) (0.229) (0.2298)
Year = 2009 -1.108*** -1.137*** -1.1368***
(0.242) (0.242) (0.2416)
Year = 2010 -0.357 -0.420* -0.3975
(0.243) (0.242) (0.2424)
Constant 17.69*** 18.05*** 17.0790***
(1.670) (1.673) (1.6940)
Observations 8,156 8,156 8,156
Adjusted R-squared 0.488 0.496 0.4976
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sex dummy Yes Yes Yes
Seller dummies Yes Yes Yes
Dealer dummies Yes Yes Yes
Intersect n/a 18.06 17.03
Note: *** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5%-level, * signiﬁcant at the 10%-
level. Robust standard errors (HC3) in parentheses. CC: dummy for subsidized (Cash-for-Clunkers)
transaction, MSRP: Manufacturer’s suggested retail price in e 1000, DC: dummy for demonstration
car, CE: dummy for employees of auto manufacturing companies. Year = 2008 (2009) (2010) are
dummy variables for the given years, 2007 is the base year. Intersect indicates where the estimated
function for subsidized purchases is equal to the baseline function.
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linear interaction term are highly signiﬁcant (1% level); merely the quadratic
interaction term shows a little weaker signiﬁcance level of 10%. While it is
easy to tell from the table that the pattern or the intersect18 remains the same
over the different speciﬁcations, we need to compare the functions estimated in
models (2) and (3) to see if they differ signiﬁcantly within the relevant price
range.
We therefore plot the two models in Figure 3 based on the estimated coeffi-
cients. We ﬁrst plot the reference line, i.e., the discount in percent as a function
of MSRP for the three models. These are the lower dashed functions in the
graph and one can see that they hardly differ. The upper functions are the
respective subsidized purchases where one can detect a little more differences
between the two models. The dashed vertical lines show the borders of the ﬁrst,
the second and the third quartile of MSRP in 2009. The two functions diverge
only from a price of roughly e 40,000 on and are very close to each other even
for rather low prices of about e 10,000. The divergence in the upper part is of
little importance as the scrappage prime did not play an important role in these
price ranges.19
The vertical solid lines show the intersects between the CC and non-CC
functions, i.e., the point where there is no difference in discount between a
purchase with and without the subsidy. One can see that the intersect is in
both cases located within the second quartile.20
A general conclusion is that subsidized buyers of the ﬁrst quartile faced neg-
ative price discrimination, i.e., they paid more (experienced a lower discount)
if they received the subsidy. In contrast, subsidized buyers in the third (and
fourth) quartile faced positive price discrimination, meaning they had to pay
18For the quadratic model, the intersect is calculated by solving the quadratic equation. We
calculated the intersect where the CC curve is steeper than the non-CC curve, i.e., the
intersect below the maximum.
19There are two major reasons for this: First, the relative importance of the lump-sum subsidy
decreases when the car gets more expensive. Second, as the subsidy could only be requested
when an old car was scrapped, the old car needed to be of a very low resale value. In
general, buyers of expensive cars beneﬁted much more from trading in their old car than
scrapping it for e 2,500.
20A cubic speciﬁcation (available upon request) would not change this result.
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Figure 3: Linear and Quadratic Model for Year 2009
less (received more discount) if buying with the subsidy. The positive price
discrimination effect in the upper part of the distribution overcompensates the
negative effect in the lower part. The reported CC coefficient β from speciﬁca-
tion (1) of Table 4 therefore needs to be interpreted as a weighted average rather
than a level effect. Within the second quartile, ﬁnally, the difference between
the CC and the non-CC function was just zero. This implies that within the
second quartile of MSRP, car dealers did not price discriminate at all and that
CC customers therefore received the full amount of the subsidy or e 2,500.
5.4 The Relevant Price Range
But how relevant is the region we are considering and are subsidized and non-
subsidized purchases balanced (meaning whether the shares of CC and non-CC
purchases are rather equal and therefore comparable)? If this was not the case,
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our results might be misleading. Figure 3 showed that the models do not differ
within the most relevant quartiles. Figure 4 now gives some more insight into
the distribution and adds the share of CC purchases by MSRP.21 The dash-
dotted line shows the CC share as a falling function of MSRP. This is what we
expected, given that the lump-sum subsidy matters relatively more for cheaper
cars. However, in a region below e 12,000, the share is larger than 60%, reaching
up to 80% for cars of an MSRP of about e 9,000. We claim that this part of the
distribution lacks common support because its composition is so unbalanced.
The graph of the distribution (dotted density plot) is very steep on the left side
which means that there are relatively few purchases at a price range of about
e 8,000 but already many at a price of e 10,000 to e 12,000. Cutting off this
fringe, we see that from a MSRP of e 12,000 on the data points are comfortably
dense enough and the distribution between CC and non-CC purchases is rather
balanced with about 60% or less. We learned from Figure 3 that the three
models diverge from an MSRP of e 40,000 on. Yet, the share of CC purchases
drops below one third at a price of about e 32,000. We choose this point as
an upper bound for the following discussion. At this point, we still observe
a sufficiently balanced distribution between CC and non-CC purchases which
then steadily shrinks along with the density. This means that the range where
our linear model differs from the quadratic one is also a region of low common
support plus a region of low density.22 In the following discussion, we therefore
focus on a price range from e 12,000 to e 32,000 which we judge as the most
relevant interval of our data with a solid balance of CC and non-CC purchases.
5.5 Price Discrimination
As a next step, we quantify the exact amount of price discrimination over the
price interval for which our results were found to be relevant. Table 5 yields an
21To calculate the share of CC in Figure 4, we rounded the MSRP to e 1,000 and calculated
the share of subsidized purchases in 2009 for each e 1,000 price interval.
22Even though the distribution is skewed to the right which means that sales do not drop as
rapidly as the price rises.
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Table 5: Price Discrimination over different Prices and Econometric Models
MSRP Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic
(%) (e ) (%) (e )
12,000 -1.48 -178 -1.72 -206
14,000 -.99 -139 -1 -140
16,000 -.5 -80 -.33 -53
18,000 -.01 -2 .3 54
20,000 .47 94 .9 180
24,000 1.45 348 1.96 470
28,000 2.42 678 2.87 804
32,000 3.4 1088 3.62 1158
Note: The table presents price discrimination in percentage points of MSRP (%) and Euro (e )
based on the linear model from speciﬁcation (2) or the quadratic model (speciﬁcation (3)) for a
given MSRP.
overview regarding that quantiﬁcation for the linear and the quadratic model.
It provides the percentage (%) and absolute (EUR) discount received respec-
tively.23 The above mentioned intersects are located at the MSRP where the
models present a discount of just zero. Comparing the linear to the quadratic
model for what we consider the relevant price range, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant
differences: For a car with MSRP of e 12,000, the linear model yields a price
discrimination of −1.48% or e−178, the quadratic model one of −1, 72% or
e−206, i.e., a dealer induced skim-off of about 7% − 8% of the subsidy amount
(e 2,500). However, the higher-priced cars are more outstanding: a car which
cost e 28,000 and therefore is at the lower bound of the fourth quartile of MSRP
would beneﬁt from an additional discount of 2.42% or e 687 in the linear and
2.87% or e 804 in the quadratic model which means that dealers granted an
additional discount of around 27% − 32% of the subsidy; a car purchase at the
very end of our relevant MSRP range (e 32,000) did even cause an extra of
about 3.5 percentage points or e 1,100 (averaged over the two models), circa
45% of the scrappage subsidy amount.
23The Euro-values were calculated from the corresponding percentage values and the MSRP,
not from a separate estimation with discount in Euro as a dependent variable.
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5.6 Summary
In summary, our quantitative results are as follows: Linear regression results in
which we include only a scrappage dummy—and therefore measure a weighted
average over the entire price range—suggest that the demand side not only
captured 100% of the subsidy but beneﬁtted from an additional 0.4 percentage
points of discount of MSRP. This result cannot simply be monetarized as it
spans over the whole price range and we ﬁnd that discount in percent rises at a
rate of 0.05 percentage points with every e 1,000 of MSRP. Taking into account
that the effect is heterogeneous across the price range, we interact the scrappage
prime with MSRP. The coefficient for the CC-dummy then becomes −4.4 which
means the y-intersect is 4.4 percentage points lower for the CC-function than for
the function of non-subsidized purchases. The coefficient of the interaction term
is 0.24, so this function is steeper than the baseline function with a slope of 0.04
(coefficient for MSRP); with every additional e 1,000 of MSRP, the expected
discount of subsidized purchases gets 0.24 + 0, 04 = 0, 28 percentage points big-
ger. For non-subsidized it grows at the rate 0.04 per e 1,000 of MSRP. All the
relevant coefficients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The function of
the subsidized purchases thus starts lower but is steeper, implying that subsi-
dized buyers of cheap cars received a lower and subsidized buyers of expensive
cars a higher discount compared to non-subsidized buyers. The functions in-
tersect at an MSRP of e 18,000, denoting the car price where the demand side
captures the exact subsidy amount of e 2,500. A quadratic speciﬁcation does
not alter the results.
Demonstration cars earn about 11 percentage points more discount through-
out the different speciﬁcations compared to standard buyers, company employ-
ees about 11.5 percentage points. Relative to base year 2007, discounts were
about 0.6 percentage points lower in 2008 and about 1.1 to 1.3 in 2009; these
results, too, are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. In 2010, the difference
was only −0.4 percentage points and hardly statistically signiﬁcant.
We ﬁnd that for MSRPs between e 12,000 and e 32,000 there are enough
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data points and the composition is well-balanced between subsidized and non-
subsidized purchases and therefore declare that interval as the relevant price
range. For this range, we present ﬁgures of price discrimination: according
to the linear (quadratic) model, it is −1.5 (−1.7) percentage points or e−178
(e−206) at a MSRP of e 12,000, about zero percentage points at a price of
e 18,000 (e 17,000) and plus 3.4 (3.6) percentage points or e 1088 (e 1158) for
an MSRP of e 32,000.
6 Interpretation
The main result of this paper is that the incidence of the subsidy strongly and
signiﬁcantly varies across price segments. We focused most of our discussion
on three price segments that roughly correspond to the ﬁrst, second, and third
price (MSRP) quartile. In the ﬁrst quartile that mainly covers mini cars and to
some extent small cars, subsidized buyers received slightly lower discounts than
non-subsidized ones controlling for covariates. In the second quartile—mainly
consisting of small and medium cars—discounts between the two buyer groups
did not differ much, implying that the full subsidy amount remained with the
buyer. The most striking result was found for sales in the upper half of the
price distribution. We focused particularly on the third price quartile (mainly
medium and large cars), where subsidized and non-subsidized sales were quite
balanced. In this segment, scrappage prime receivers were granted much higher
discounts than regular customers. The incidence in this price segment was such
that subsidized buyers received huge extra discounts from sellers over and above
the government prime.
These ﬁndings raise two questions. The ﬁrst one concerns their compatibility
with the results of Busse et al. (2006) and Sallee (2011) on the incidence of auto
manufacturer promotions and tax credits. The second question is: What do
these results imply about price discrimination in the automobile market?
Our result for the lower price segments—loosely speaking for the bottom
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half of the distribution—is broadly in line with the results in Busse et al. (2006)
and Sallee (2011). Busse et al. (2006) ﬁnd that between 70% and 90% of the
customer promotion amount remains with the buyer, i.e., the seller reaps only
a small fraction of the promotion. Since a customer promotion is quite compa-
rable to a buyer subsidy granted by the government, the two instruments are in
fact comparable and so are our results of roughly 90% pass-through to buyers
in the ﬁrst quartile. Sallee (2011) ﬁnds that a customer directed tax subsidy
for the Toyota Prius, a small car that would fall into our second price quartile,
is fully captured by customers although sellers face a binding production con-
straint. In the case of the German scrappage prime, a production constraint was
also binding in the small-car segment since the subsidy caused a run on these
cars. Our results in the second price quartile are therefore fully in line with
Sallee’s results and in fact as surprising as his ﬁndings. While his explanation
builds mainly on long-run pricing policy of manufacturer’s we conjecture that
in the German case, increased competition due to the demand shock induced
by the government intervention additionally explains why the supply-side only
captured a small or even negligible fraction of the subsidy in the bottom half of
the distribution.
In fact, the whole discount and pricing pattern in the German 2009 car
market can be explained by price discrimination—the second question we previ-
ously raised—that depends on market conditions in different market segments.
With regard to the lower price segment two observations are crucial. On the
one hand, the scrappage program shifted demand heavily towards smaller cars.
This gave dealers some market power and thus allowed for price making. Addi-
tionally, dealers were able to identify two groups with a different price elasticity
of demand in this segment, namely subsidized and non-subsidized buyers. In
contrast to non-subsidized customers, buyers receiving the subsidy and aiming
at this market segment were presumably relatively more price-inelastic since the
subsidy was available only for a very short period of time and because people
were keen on seizing the opportunity of grabbing a e 2,500 check. In addition,
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close substitutes for mini and small cars were not available since downgrading
was hardly possible and the demand shock essentially affected all brands alike.
Altogether, this suggests that there was room for price discrimination based
on observables (the scrappage prime information) in the lower price segment.
On the other hand, it is well-known that competition in the market for small
cars is quite high (see e.g. Sudhir (2001) for US evidence) and competition pre-
sumably increased in 2009 due to the scrappage subsidy. However, competition
limits the scope for price discrimination. In particular, in a competitive market
where brand loyalty is not (yet) established, price elasticity is presumably not
spectacularly different across buyer groups. Dealers and manufactures contem-
plating to enforce higher markups for subsidy receivers therefore had to trade
off higher margins against lower sales in the short run. Also, long-run pricing
considerations along the lines of Sallee (2011) may have played a role in the
pricing policy. Together, this explains why there was some price discrimination
against scrappage prime receivers but less than one may have expected a priori,
leaving the bulk of the subsidy with buyers of small cars.
Things were very different in the upper price segment. Here, the market was
slack and unsold cars were piling up. From an upper-segment car dealer’s per-
spective an interesting and unique potentially proﬁt maximizing strategy was
possible due to the subsidy. In a nutshell, customers aiming at the large-car
segment could be divided into two observable groups with different price elas-
ticities of demand, namely regular large-car buyers who tended not to receive the
subsidy and subsidized buyers who would typically not buy a large car. First,
non-subsidized (regular) customers in the upper price segment did not receive
exceptional rebates since that would interfere with the well-known cooperative
pricing strategy of car manufacturers towards brand loyal long-term customers
(see e.g. Sudhir (2001)). This would have unnecessarily eroded margins without
increasing long-term demand in that customer segment. In fact, interviews with
car dealers suggest that a selection effect was working in their favor. Subsidized
buyers were typically not customers for pricey cars and would usually not up-
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grade from a clunker to a new expensive car. Therefore, their price elasticity of
demand for large cars was quite high which lead dealers to offer exceptionally
high discounts to this customer group, consistent with our ﬁndings. Offering
high rebates to subsidized customers on the other hand did not interfere with
long-run pricing considerations of manufacturers since the new customer group
was a one-time target without any signiﬁcant downside risk with regard to their
long-run car demand for large-car manufacturers.
In summary, our results on the incidence of the scrappage subsidy are in line
with an optimal long-run pricing strategy of manufacturers and dealers in the car
market. Firms in the small-car segments tend to be aggressive and room for price
discrimination based on observable characteristics—such as the information of
receiving the scrappage prime—is limited due to strong competition. This is in
line with our ﬁnding that in the lower half of the price distribution the bulk of
the scrappage subsidy remained with the buyer. With regard to the larger-car
segments, aggressive pricing is usually avoided since aggressive pricing reduces
margins without increasing demand of regular customers who tend to be very
brand loyal in that market segment. However, granting huge discounts to a new,
observable group of customers who could be distinguished from the old and loyal
ones based on the scrappage prime information offered a one-time opportunity to
increase proﬁts for large-car manufacturers and dealers by increasing sales. This
is in line with our main ﬁnding that subsidized buyers of large cars eventually
received extra discounts on top of the the scrappage subsidy amount.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
A possible concern is that the results are either driven by neglected time-effects
or by subgroups. We therefore present sensitivity checks including additional
time controls or restricting the data to 2009; after that, we successively drop
subsets of the data which might be driving the results. Table 6 sums up the tests
we ran on our data sample. It reports the most relevant ﬁgures: the number of
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observations (Obs), the intersect, i.e., the point where there is no difference in
discount between a subsidized and a non-subsidized car (Int), the coefficient for
the scrappage prime (CC ), the coefficient of the interaction term (CC*MSRP),
and the percentage levels of price discrimination for a e 12,000, a e 18,000, and
a e 32,000 car purchase (PD12, PD18 and PD32 ).
The ﬁrst row represents the linear model based on the full data, i.e., the
reference results from speciﬁcation (2) in Table 4. In the following row, we
additionally add two time controls to the model: a dummy for the switch from
the paper-based to the electronic subsidy application procedure (Time 1 ) and a
time dummy for the expansion of the program from e 1.5 to e 5 Billion (Time
2 ). One can see that the inclusion of these further controls does not alter the
results signiﬁcantly.
In the third row, we restrict our sample to year 2009 only. While the price
discrimination measured for an MSRP of e 12,000 is slightly lower, the over-
all pattern remains the same. This indicates that we do not simply observe a
difference because 2009 was very special but that the hypothesis of price dis-
crimination actually holds.
As discussed on page 12, we need to make sure that our results are not
driven by composition effects stemming from unequal shares of high-discount
groups. In addition to correcting for different levels of discount (note that the
coefficients are very stable over all considered speciﬁcations), we exclude both
groups from the regression: ﬁrst, company employees (No CE, fourth row),
then demonstration cars (No DC, ﬁfth row) and, in row 6, both. None of these
exclusion changes the results signiﬁcantly.
In row 7, we exclude the three vehicle classes that do not enter the “natural”
order, i.e., SUVs (J ), MPVs (M ) and Sports Coupés (S).24 Still, our essential
results remain valid.
Rows 8-14 show the results when leaving out single brand-dealers. They
illustrate that the results of our analysis are not driven by a single group of those
24The other vehicle classes are cardinally by size and, most important, price. The three
excluded vehicle classes are not part of this order and might be special for various reasons.
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Table 6: Sensitivity Checks – Overview
No Case Obs Int CC CC* PD12 PD18 PD32
MSRP
1 All data 8156 18.06 -4.4 .24 -1.48 -.01 3.4
2 Time 1 and 2 8156 18.47 -4.73 .26 -1.66 -.12 3.47
3 2009 only 3190 17.28 -3.01 .17 -.92 .13 2.56
4 No CE 7188 18.85 -4.77 .25 -1.73 -.21 3.33
5 No DC 6836 16.76 -4.49 .27 -1.28 .33 4.09
6 No CE, no DC 5868 17.56 -4.96 .28 -1.57 .12 4.08
7 No VC J, M, S 6059 16.29 -3.9 .24 -1.03 .41 3.77
8 No BD1 6692 17.58 -3.92 .22 -1.24 .09 3.21
9 No BD2 5990 18.72 -4.43 .24 -1.59 -.17 3.15
10 No BD3 6657 15.76 -3.29 .21 -.78 .47 3.38
11 No BD4 7862 17.89 -4.4 .25 -1.45 .03 3.47
12 No BD5 8010 18.37 -4.52 .25 -1.57 -.09 3.35
13 No BD6 6288 16.61 -4.49 .27 -1.24 .38 4.16
14 No BD7 7437 20.95 -5.74 .27 -2.45 -.81 3.02
Note: All data is the regression presented above as a benchmark for the sensitivity tests. Time 1
and 2 includes two time controls for program changes (electronic application procedure and budget
increase, 2009 only is a restriction to year 2009 only. Lines 4 to 14 present the exclusion of different
groups: CE = company employees and DC = demonstration cars are high discount receivers, (VC
J, M, S) are the three vehicle classes which are not part of a natural order, i.e. MPVs (M), SUVs
(J), and Sports Coupés (S). BD1 to BD7 are different brand-dealer combinations.
categories. The intersect is rather stable over the different data restrictions: it
may fall down to about e 16,000 (row 10) but can also move up to roughly
e 21,000 (row 14). On average, however, it is located around e 17,000 to 18,000
and therefore meets the dimension of our full model.25
Overall, Table 6 demonstrates that our ﬁndings are robust to an extensive
variety of sensitivity checks. It is unlikely that the presented estimation results
are caused by ignored program inﬂuences, differences over time, high discount
groups or special vehicle classes, as well as single dealers or brands.
8 Conclusion
We evaluate the incidence of the German scrappage program from 2009, the
most expensive program of all countries in that time period with a total volume
25Regression tables including time controls and excluding high discount groups are reported
in the appendix. The less relevant tables excluding single brand-dealers and restricting to
year 2009 only are available upon request.
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of e 5 billion ($7 billion). Applying linear regression models to a unique sample
of micro transaction data we model the percentage discount as a function of the
MSRP, a dummy for the scrapping prime, and various controls. In a ﬁrst step, we
surprisingly ﬁnd that the subsidy is captured by the customers by slightly more
than 100%. We therefore allow for heterogeneity across price segments when
comparing subsidized to non-subsidized purchases and ﬁnd that these differ
signiﬁcantly. Subsidized buyers of the ﬁrst quartile (cheap cars) faced negative
price discrimination, i.e., received less discount than non-subsidized buyers. For
a e 12,000 car purchase about 1.6 percentage points of the MSRP were skimmed
off by car dealers. This implies that dealers captured approximately 8% of the
subsidy. Somewhere in the second quartile, for a price of about e 18,000, we
observe no pass-through meaning that customers captured the entire subsidy of
e 2,500. Above the median MSRP, the discount for subsidized buyers was higher
than the discount for non-subsidized ones. For a e 32,000 car, dealers granted
an extra 3.5 percentage points of the MSRP or about 45% of the subsidy, i.e.,
they granted an extra discount of roughly e 1,100 to attract customers receiving
the subsidy in comparison to those who did not.
This pattern can be explained by price discrimination depending on market
conditions in different market segments. The scrappage program shifted de-
mand heavily towards the lowest price segment (small cars) giving dealers some
market power in this quite segmented market which allowed for price making.
Additionally, dealers were able to identify two groups with a different price elas-
ticity of demand. The group of subsidized buyers was eager to buy a new—and
due to the subsidy—very cheap car and therefore tended to be comparatively
less price sensitive. In contrast to this, the other group of non-subsidized buyers
was more price sensitive. Therefore, in this price segment car dealers were able
to enforce a price-markup for the subsidized group by granting lower discounts
compared to non-subsidized buyers. In the upper price segment (large cars),
demand was slack due to the ﬁnancial crisis and therefore stocks were piling
up. Dealers used additional discounts in order to attract the subsidized buyer
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group who would have otherwise tended to buy a car in a lower price segment
(medium cars). In the upper price segment, receiving the subsidy therefore re-
vealed relatively high price elasticity because market segmentation did not exist
or was not perfect.
Finally, our estimation results turn out to be extremely robust to all kinds
of data restrictions as well as model modiﬁcations.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Appendix 1: Data
Table 7: Number of Purchases over Car Brands and Car Dealers
Car Brand
Car Dealer 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Dealer 1 0 2166 0 0 0 0 2166
Dealer 2 1464 0 0 0 0 0 1464
Dealer 3 0 1499 0 0 0 0 1499
Dealer 4 0 0 0 0 1868 0 1868
Dealer 5 0 0 294 0 0 0 294
Dealer 6 0 0 0 146 0 719 865
Total 1464 3665 294 146 1868 719 8156
Table 8: Number of Purchases over Month of all Years, 2009 by CC
Year of Purchase and Clunker’s Prime
2007 2008 2009 2009 2010
Month of Purchase Non-
CC
CC
1 103 109 115 25 101
2 85 132 139 93 120
3 162 175 183 206 230
4 154 225 157 200 159
5 147 159 115 221 183
6 142 172 156 198 166
7 118 149 129 192 133
8 116 85 107 150 133
9 140 115 136 102 129
10 109 145 145 100 143
11 134 120 137 41 114
12 144 115 130 13 100
Total 1554 1701 1649 1541 1711
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Table 9: Summary Statistics: 2009 only
Variables Mean SD Med Min Max N
Discount in Percent 17.11 7.82 16.75 0.00 45.61 3,190
Discount in 1000 EUR 3.99 3.20 3.25 0.00 51.81 3,190
MSRP in 1000 EUR 23.02 12.76 19.25 8.69 130.35 3,190
Clunker’s Prime (CC) 0.48 0.50 0 0 1 3,190
Demonstration Car (DC) 0.14 0.35 0 0 1 3,190
Company Employee (CE) 0.13 0.33 0 0 1 3,190
Female 0.32 0.46 0 0 1 3,190
Age at Purchase 46.79 15.09 48 18 89 639
Note: MSRP is the manufacturer suggested retail price. DC is a dummy variable indicating whether
a buyer bought a demonstration car (DC = 1). CE is a dummy variable indicating whether the
buyer was an employee of a car manufacturing company (CE = 1). CC is a dummy variable
indicating whether the buyer of a car received the scrappage subsidy (CC = 1). Female is a dummy
of female buyers, the summary statistics therefore report the share of women.
Table 10: Summary Statistics over vehicle class
Catalog price in 1.000 EUR
EU Vehicle Class Mean SD N
A - Mini Cars 11.59 1.29 649
B - Small Cars 16.09 2.59 2611
C - Medium Cars 23.76 4.22 1649
D - Large Cars 38.94 7.87 899
E - Executive Cars 58.32 11.54 232
F - Luxury Cars 106.91 15.54 19
J - SUV 40.18 14.68 481
M - MPV 27.25 7.28 1429
S - Sports Coupés 61.09 25.51 187
Total 25.62 14.37 8156
Note: SUV stands for Sport Utility Vehicle, MPV for Multi Purpose Vehicle.
Table 11: Percentage Discount over Time by CC
Discount in Percent
Non-CC CC Total
Year of Purchase MeanSD N MeanSD N MeanSD N
2007 15.69 9.01 1554 0 15.69 9.01 1554
2008 16.54 9.64 1701 0 16.54 9.64 1701
2009 17.67 8.73 1649 16.51 6.67 1541 17.11 7.82 3190
2010 18.03 8.74 1711 0 18.03 8.74 1711
Total 17.01 9.09 6615 16.51 6.67 1541 16.91 8.68 8156
Note: Non-CC are non-subsidized purchases, CC subsidized ones. The last part of the table gives
summary statistics for the whole group.
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Table 12: Percentage Discount by Purchase Types
Discount in Percent
Type of Purchase Mean SD N
Standard 14.02 7.44 5868
Company Employee 25.84 4.03 968
Demonstration Car 23.25 8.47 1320
Total 16.91 8.68 8156
Note: Standard are the benchmark purchases, Company Employees are employees of a car man-
ufacturing company, Demonstration Car denotes cars that are not new but have been used for
exposition.
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Figure 5: MSRP over Time by EU-Vehicle Class
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9.2 Appendix 2: Sensitivity analysis
9.2.1 Regressions including time controls
Table 13: Including time controls
All transactions with time controls
Dependent variable: Discount in Percent of MSRP
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
CC 0.320 -4.729*** -7.3795***
(0.234) (0.506) (1.3129)
CC*MSRP 0.256*** 0.5174***
(0.0231) (0.1211)
(CC*MSRP)2 -0.0053**
(0.0026)
MSRP 0.0444*** 0.0319*** 0.0836***
(0.00815) (0.00797) (0.0172)
MSRP2 -0.0005***
(0.0002)
DC 10.96*** 10.82*** 10.7976***
(0.279) (0.277) (0.2760)
CE 11.52*** 11.59*** 11.5761***
(0.312) (0.310) (0.3113)
Year = 2008 -0.633*** -0.655*** -0.6759***
(0.231) (0.230) (0.2300)
Year = 2009 -2.692*** -2.953*** -2.9664***
(0.354) (0.353) (0.3512)
Year = 2010 -0.383 -0.453* -0.4309*
(0.243) (0.242) (0.2426)
Constant 18.16*** 18.60*** 17.6703***
(1.640) (1.638) (1.6593)
Observations 8,156 8,156 8,156
Adjusted R-squared 0.490 0.499 0.5008
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sex dummy Yes Yes Yes
Seller dummies Yes Yes Yes
Dealer dummies Yes Yes Yes
Time 1 + 2 Yes Yes Yes
Intersect n/a 18.47 17.38
Note: *** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5%-level, * signiﬁcant at the 10%-
level. Robust standard errors (HC3) in parentheses. CC: dummy for subsidized (Cash-for-Clunkers)
transaction, MSRP: Manufacturer’s suggested retail price in e 1000, DC: dummy for demonstration
car, CE: dummy for employees of auto manufacturing companies. Year = 2008 (2009) (2010) are
dummy variables for the given years, 2007 is the base year. Intersect indicates where the estimated
function for subsidized purchases is equal to the baseline function.
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9.2.2 Regressions excluding company employees and demonstration
cars
Table 14: All but company employees
Without company employees
Dependent variable: Discount in Percent of MSRP
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
CC 0.304 -4.768*** -7.5289***
(0.267) (0.554) (1.4155)
CC*MSRP 0.253*** 0.5303***
(0.0242) (0.1286)
(CC*MSRP)2 -0.0057**
(0.0027)
MSRP 0.0482*** 0.0365*** 0.1062***
(0.00874) (0.00850) (0.0191)
MSRP2 -0.0007***
(0.0002)
DC 10.95*** 10.81*** 10.7782***
(0.277) (0.276) (0.2746)
Year = 2008 -0.936*** -0.953*** -0.9769***
(0.246) (0.245) (0.2452)
Year = 2009 -0.703*** -0.725*** -0.7490***
(0.268) (0.268) (0.2667)
Year = 2010 -0.0395 -0.114 -0.0956
(0.263) (0.262) (0.2621)
Constant 17.38*** 17.74*** 16.4819***
(1.676) (1.678) (1.7056)
Observations 7,188 7,188 7,188
Adjusted R-squared 0.415 0.424 0.4278
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sex dummy Yes Yes Yes
Seller dummies Yes Yes Yes
Dealer dummies Yes Yes Yes
Intersect n/a 18.85 17.48
Note: *** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5%-level, * signiﬁcant at the 10%-
level. Robust standard errors (HC3) in parentheses. CC: dummy for subsidized (Cash-for-Clunkers)
transaction, MSRP: Manufacturer’s suggested retail price in e 1000, DC: dummy for demonstration
car, CE: dummy for employees of auto manufacturing companies. Year = 2008 (2009) (2010) are
dummy variables for the given years, 2007 is the base year. Intersect indicates where the estimated
function for subsidized purchases is equal to the baseline function.
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Table 15: All but demonstration cars
Without demonstration cars
Dependent variable: Discount in Percent of MSRP
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
CC 0.581** -4.495*** -10.1162***
(0.236) (0.531) (1.0468)
CC*MSRP 0.268*** 0.8296***
(0.0251) (0.0928)
(CC*MSRP)2 -0.0122***
(0.0020)
MSRP 0.0557*** 0.0395*** 0.0675***
(0.00870) (0.00837) (0.0178)
MSRP2 -0.0003*
(0.0002)
CE 11.52*** 11.60*** 11.6210***
(0.311) (0.311) (0.3118)
Year = 2008 -1.325*** -1.340*** -1.3310***
(0.242) (0.241) (0.2415)
Year = 2009 -2.056*** -2.092*** -2.0532***
(0.253) (0.253) (0.2529)
Year = 2010 -1.037*** -1.096*** -1.0520***
(0.251) (0.250) (0.2505)
Constant 23.51*** 23.89*** 23.3772***
(3.917) (3.928) (3.9484)
Observations 6,836 6,836 6,836
Adjusted R-squared 0.490 0.499 0.5026
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sex dummy Yes Yes Yes
Seller dummies Yes Yes Yes
Dealer dummies Yes Yes Yes
Intersect n/a 16.76 15.93
Note: *** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5%-level, * signiﬁcant at the 10%-
level. Robust standard errors (HC3) in parentheses. CC: dummy for subsidized (Cash-for-Clunkers)
transaction, MSRP: Manufacturer’s suggested retail price in e 1000, DC: dummy for demonstration
car, CE: dummy for employees of auto manufacturing companies. Year = 2008 (2009) (2010) are
dummy variables for the given years, 2007 is the base year. Intersect indicates where the estimated
function for subsidized purchases is equal to the baseline function.
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Table 16: All but company employees and demonstration cars
Without company employees and demonstration cars
Dependent variable: Discount in Percent of MSRP
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
CC 0.468* -4.957*** -11.0746***
(0.278) (0.598) (1.1582)
CC*MSRP 0.282*** 0.8963***
(0.0272) (0.1018)
(CC*MSRP)2 -0.0134***
(0.0022)
MSRP 0.0623*** 0.0457*** 0.0919***
(0.00972) (0.00924) (0.0179)
MSRP2 -0.0005***
(0.0001)
Year = 2008 -1.782*** -1.801*** -1.7929***
(0.261) (0.260) (0.2608)
Year = 2009 -1.651*** -1.681*** -1.6452***
(0.285) (0.285) (0.2846)
Year = 2010 -0.715*** -0.785*** -0.7361***
(0.276) (0.275) (0.2752)
Constant 7.254*** 7.539*** 6.8425***
(0.595) (0.511) (0.6560)
Observations 5,868 5,868 5,868
Adjusted R-squared 0.330 0.343 0.3497
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sex dummy Yes Yes Yes
Seller dummies Yes Yes Yes
Dealer dummies Yes Yes Yes
Intersect n/a 17.56 16.34
Note: *** signiﬁcant at the 1%-level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5%-level, * signiﬁcant at the 10%-
level. Robust standard errors (HC3) in parentheses. CC: dummy for subsidized (Cash-for-Clunkers)
transaction, MSRP: Manufacturer’s suggested retail price in e 1000, DC: dummy for demonstration
car, CE: dummy for employees of auto manufacturing companies. Year = 2008 (2009) (2010) are
dummy variables for the given years, 2007 is the base year. Intersect indicates where the estimated
function for subsidized purchases is equal to the baseline function.
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